Research

Firms today must assess the impact of new trade policies within a complex global business landscape shaped by expanding global value chains and geopolitical risks. How do they respond to new trade policies under discussion? We argue that firms take informational cues from other firms in the same industry and along their supply chains. We test this through a survey experiment with Japanese firm managers, examining their reactions to China’s potential entry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Our findings show that positive views from large co-industry firms and supply chain partners lead to negative assessments by managers, not only among small firms but also among large exporting firms, driven by fears of rising domestic competition. Concerns also extend to the broader national economic impact. The study contributes to understanding the micro-foundations of trade politics, highlighting the firm heterogeneity in their response to multifaceted trade policies.

States have long used economic sanctions in response to violations of international law as a strategy to restore order. Increasingly, firms also reject doing business with violators. In response to the war in Ukraine, hundreds of multinational corporations (MNCs) voluntarily withdrew from Russia, even when policymakers were still debating the extent of sanctions. Why did private firms halt their business? We argue that peer effects among firms shape reactions to international crises. We test our argument using an original survey experiment with Japanese firm managers conducted within three months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. We find evidence of peer conformity as news about withdrawal by other firms---in particular firms from a diverse set of countries---increases support for firm withdrawal. The survey results also reveal the countervailing influence of peer competition, as news about some firms continuing business with the sanction target lowers support for firm withdrawal. Market exposure moderates these reactions to information about the actions of other firms, although the concern about peer behavior does not appear to be driven by a reputation mechanism. Our research provides insight into the preferences of business actors toward international conflicts.

How can scholars conduct field research when there is limited access to the field? This article first identifies how limited and uncertain field access can affect field research and then provides recommendations to address these challenges. We focus on conducting field research in Japan because of our substantive expertise, but we believe that the problems and solutions outlined in this article are applicable to a broad range of countries. Our hope is that this article contributes to the developing literature on conducting research during times of emergency and to the larger literature on best practices for field research.

A fast-growing literature indicates that firms' engagement in foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade is key to understanding deepening global value chains and their political implications. However, existing studies have mainly focused on the ramifications for FDI home countries while often overlooking the firm-product-level interactions between FDI and trade, where their interdependencies manifest. This study examines how firms' FDI reshapes host countries' trade profiles at this level, empowering new political coalitions for trade liberalization. Analyzing greenfield FDI projects globally since 2003, we find that hosts experienced an average increase of over 45 export products in the following year. To overcome the challenges of connecting firms to products, we link FDI data with Vietnamese customs records. We find that Vietnamese export (import) volumes of FDI-related products increased by 90% (30%) within four years of initial investments. Importantly, these products also benefited from more substantial tariff cuts in bilateral Free Trade Agreements.

One of the critical functions of international organizations (IO) is to provide information. However, instead of always conveying all the information they have, IOs strategically select which information to provide. How does existence of competitors, a common factor under overlapping institutions today, affect IO’s function to provide information? While the literature has debated whether overlapping institutions encourage or hinder better rule-making and compliance, this paper looks at a less-studied aspect of this consequence: IO’s role as an information provider. I first develop a model to argue that entries of additional IOs help motivate the incumbent IOs to reveal more information when the information is verifiable type. Yet the model predicts that there are also cases where overlapping institutions hinder information transmission – for less verifiable types of information, entries of new IOs may not encourage incumbent IOs to convey full information as they foster competition over support from domestic actors. I illustrate this with a case of overlapping institutions providing energy projections, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), using text and numeric data of energy outlooks and policy papers they published. Moreover, through an analysis of U.S. governmental documents citing the IEA and other energy organizations, I show that, upon entries of competing IOs, the context in which incumbent IO’s information is cited became even more biased toward those on conventional energy. This supports the mechanism that domestic actors shape the incentives these IOs hold over their information provision.

How do firms address difficulties in running businesses abroad and make foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions? Research in the politics of FDI highlights that political conditions in the destination market (host government characteristics) or the nationality of firms affect firms’ decisions to invest abroad. This paper argues that ties with the home government, which vary at the firm level, also impact firms’ FDI strategies. In particular, we argue that home state–business relations shaped by revolving door hiring encourage firms’ business abroad via two mechanisms. First, they bring access to information and resources that help firms navigate through bureaucratic regulatory procedures abroad. Second, home bureaucrats help firms build connections with the host government that give the firm a better sense of protection against future expropriation risks. We test this theory using micro-level data from Japan—a country that, in 2009, passed civil service reforms that mandate public reporting of the re-employment of all retired civil servants. We use this information to retrieve the full network of bureaucracy–firm connections built through revolving-door employment for the period 2009–2017. We combine this novel data with a firm-level business activity survey conducted by the Japanese government, covering the basic characteristics, subsidiaries, and investment activities of 24,870 Japanese firms. We find that firms with more bureaucratic ties are indeed more likely to invest abroad. Our interviews with governmental officials and business representatives show support for the proposed mechanisms. The findings imply that even within the same nationality or productivity level, firms with ties to home bureaucrats are more successful in doing business abroad.

Political economists have long speculated about the e↵ects of connections between bureaucracies and the private sector. However, data tracing flows of civil servants from the bureaucracy to the private sector remains rare. This article presents a new dataset, Amakudata, which contains individual-level data of virtually all Japanese bureaucrats retiring into positions outside of the bureaucracy from 2009 to 2019. We first present how the dataset was created and validated. Next, we describe what the data reveals about the revolving door in Japan and beyond, and show that some sectors may be larger hirers of government personnel than previously thought. We conclude by discussing how the data can be used to investigate empirical and causal questions in diverse subjects such as corruption and regulatory capture; procurement, pork, and government waste; bureaucratic representation; and international trade and investment.